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Abstract
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) find that Chinese import competition induced a
rise in patenting, IT adoption, and TFP by up to 30% of the total increase in Europe
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We uncover several coding errors in an important
robustness check of their patent results. When corrected, we find no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between Chinese competition and patents. Other specifications in
the original paper use a problematic log(1 + patents) transformation. This normalization
induces bias given low average patent counts for firms in China-competing sectors, and
rapidly declining patents across the sample.
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1 Introduction
The rise of Chinese import competition in advanced markets is one of the transformative
events of the past 30 years of economic history. A major question is what impact this
event has had on innovation. In an influential contribution, Bloom et al. (2016, hereafter
BDvR) find that increased Chinese import competition in Europe in the late 1990s and
early 2000s stimulated growth in patenting, IT, and TFP by up to 30%. This is a
remarkable result which contradicts Autor et al. (forthcoming), who find a negative
impact of Chinese competition on US patents.
We find that BDvR make several coding errors in their Table 7 robustness check on
patents, which uses a negative binomial regression. When corrected, we find that Chinese
competition either reduced or had no significant impact on patenting in Europe.
BDvR’s research design is an intuitive difference-in-difference strategy, comparing
patents held by European firms in sectors that were more or less exposed to Chinese
competition before and after China joined the WTO. Since there are many firms with
zero patents, for most of their paper, BDvR normalize patents by adding one and then
taking log differences (e.g., ∆log(1+patents)). This solution is generally problematic, and
it is particularly so in this instance. The reason is that adding a small positive constant
impacts smaller values more than larger ones, and firms in the China-competing sectors
had relatively few patents to begin with. In addition, patents in all sectors converge
toward zero in their data, creating upward bias in patent growth for firms with few
initial patents.
The single exercise in BDvR immune from this critique is their robustness check
using a negative binomial regression, designed to estimate count data models including
frequent zero observations. No variable transformation is needed in that case. However,
they make several coding errors on implementation, such as continuing to normalize
patents by adding one and including different FEs than what they described in the
text of their paper. When we estimate the model using actual patent data without a
transformation, there is no correlation between Chinese competition and patents. When
we also include their intended FEs, we find a negative and significant relationship.
2 The BDvR Patent Data
We use BDvR’s data. The firm-level variables for 12 European countries mostly come
from Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus, and are then matched to UN Comtrade trade data at
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the 4-digit SIC level using Pierce and Schott (2012)’s trade data concordance.1 Other
sector-level variables come from Eurostat’s Prodcom database.
2.1 Difference-in-Difference Diagram
In Figure 1, we present a standard difference-in-difference event study diagram for two of
the main data samples used by BDvR (the baseline sample and a longer one). BDvR used
the removal of textile quotas upon China’s WTO entry as a proxy or IV for intensifying
competition. We compare the evolution of patents in textile sectors in which the quotas
on Chinese imports were most binding before their removal (and thus, the sectors in
which Chinese imports increased the most following removal), to sectors in which the
quotas did not bind (and thus the removal of quotas mattered less).
(a) Baseline Panel (b) Long Panel
Figure 1: Avg. Patents by Firm, Textile Sector: Sectors with Quota vs. Others
Notes: The red solid line shows the average patents over time in China-competing textile sectors (firms
in sectors that faced textile quotas before they were relaxed and removed), with two standard deviation
error bounds (the red dashed lines; computed by regressing patents per firm on a constant for each
year). The blue lines show the evolution of average patents for textile firms in the “no quota” group.
The first black vertical line denotes China’s accession to the WTO, and the second one shows when the
final quotas were removed.
In Panel (a), it can be seen that patents converge to zero for both the treatment and
control group. This declining trend in patents arises because each patent is counted by
the year of application, and in the later years, the patents may still have been pending
at time of data collection. In addition, initial patents are lower for the China-competing
1. Their data is available here: http://www.stanford.edu/ nbloom/TITC.zip. The countries in the
sample include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK.
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group, implying a larger bias from adding one. There is also a difference in the pre-trends
between the treatment and control groups.
BDvR use the long panel to show that their results are robust to controlling for
sectoral and firm-level trends. However, the same tapering is present in Panel (b), where
it can be seen that patents in the China-competing sectors (red line) also converge toward
zero. From 2000 to 2005, the raw percentage decline in both the China-competing and
non-competing groups is the same.
2.2 Implications of Normalizing Patents
If there are similar percentage declines in patents in the treatment and control groups,
why do BDvR find a large and significant impact of Chinese competition? The reason
is that their results are biased in part due to: (1) the (patents + 1) normalization, (2)
the differential levels of patents in the China-competing and non-competing sectors, and
(3) the tapering of the patent data. The small absolute number of average patents
per firm exacerbates the bias. To fix ideas, in Table 1, Panel A, we show that in the
baseline sample average patents per firm fell by 94% for firms in sectors that compete
with China the most from 2000 to 2005, but also fell by 94% for firms in sectors that
were less exposed to China. However, if we first normalize patents by adding one and
then compute the percentage change, we arrive at a 39% decline for the China-competing
firms vs. a 63% decline for other firms. This difference is an artifact of the normalization
and the lower level of initial patents among China-competing firms. In Panel B, we see
that the tapering induces bias in the longer sample as well.
3 Negative Binomial Panel Regressions
Given the concerns with the one plus patents normalization, BDvR’s negative binomial
regression becomes a critical robustness check.2 Following the empirical workhorse model
in the patenting literature (Hausman et al., 1984), BDvR adopt a negative binomial panel
regression specification of the following form:
PATijkt = exp[αIMP
CHN
jkt + x
′
ikj0β + fkt] + νijkt, (3.1)
2. The problem of adding one has been shown to produce biased estimates in many other settings.
For example, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Head and Mayer (2014) in the empirical trade literature,
or Bellego and Pape (2019) for a more general discussion. Bellemare and Wichman (2020) recommend
using a zero-inflated poisson or negative binomial when the dependent variable contains many zeros.
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Table 1: Implications of Normalizing Patents
Sample Measure
Avg. Patents per
Firm, 2000
Avg. Patents per
Firm, 2005 % Change
Panel A: Baseline Sample
China-Competing Firms (Quotas Bind) Patents 0.72 0.042 -94%
Patents + 1 1.72 1.042 -39%
Other Firms (Quotas not Binding) Patents 1.97 0.11 -94%
Patents + 1 2.97 1.11 -63%
Panel B: Long Sample
China-Competing Firms (Quotas Bind) Patents 0.71 0.053 -92%
Patents + 1 1.71 1.053 -38%
Other Firms (Quotas not Binding) Patents 2.09 0.17 -92%
Patents + 1 3.09 1.17 -62%
Notes: We compare the % decline in patents between 2000 and 2005, the period in the sample when
Chinese competition increases the most, using two different measures: average patents per firm, and
average patents per firm plus one, the latter measure being the one used by BDvR. Panel A includes
data for BDvR’s short data set. Panel B uses data from BDvR’s long data panel.
where IMPCHNjkt is the share of imports from China in sector j in country k at time t,
x′ikj0 denotes a vector of two controls, initial pre-sample patents, and a dummy for zero
patents (the latter two variables included to approximate firm FEs, according to BDvR),
and fkt are country*year interactive fixed effects. BDvR then estimate this model over
the period 1996 to 2005.
However, when they implement this regression, they make three coding errors: (1)
they continue to use one plus patents as their dependent variable; (2) they replace the
country*year interactive FEs with separate year and country dummies; and (3) they
inadvertently include 4-digit SIC FEs, which are absent from previous regressions using
patents. We correct these errors one by one.
In the first column of Table 2, we replicate BDvR’s Table 7, column (3), estimating a
negative binomial regression. This regression inadvertently uses patents plus one as the
dependent variable and also contains different fixed effects than described in the text of
their paper. In column (2) we run the same regression using the actual patent count
(instead of patents plus one). When we do so, we get a negative, albeit insignificant,
coefficient on Chinese imports. When we also include country*year FEs, the sign flips
but remains statistically insignificant. In column (4), when we also exclude the 4-digit
SIC FEs, we find a negative and significant correlation between Chinese imports and
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patents. Column (4) is the regression that BDvR intended to run. In conclusion, we
find that the positive relationship between Chinese imports and patents is not robust.
Table 2: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Patent Growth
(1)
Negative Binomial
BDV Baseline
(2)
Negative Binomial
Change Dep. Var.
(3)
Negative Binomial
+Cty*Year FEs
(4)
Negative Binomial
ex-SIC4 FEs
Level of Chinese Imports 0.40** -0.15 0.12 -0.73**
(MChinajk /M
W orld
jk ) (0.17) (0.47) (0.49) (0.34)
Dependent Variable 1+Patents Patents Patents Patents
Country*Year FEs No No Yes Yes
SIC4 Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes No
Country FEs Yes Yes No No
Year FEs Yes Yes No No
Clusters 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,578
Firms 8,780 8,780 8,780 8,780
Observations 74038 74038 74038 74038
Notes: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, with standard errors clustered at the country*4-digit
SIC level. These are negative binomial regressions on data at the firm-year level from 1996 to
2005. The dependent variable is patents plus one in column (1) (BDvR’s specification) and simply
patents in columns (2)-(4). Column (1) is an exact replication of BDvR Table 7, Column (3).
Column (4) is the regression BDvR intended to run.
4 Conclusion
BDvR find that Chinese competition may have caused a dramatic 30% increase in patent
growth in Europe over the period 1996-2005. Yet, we uncover several coding errors in an
important robustness check that, when fixed, render their results insignificant, or even
suggest a negative correlation between Chinese competition and patents. We show that
the decline in patents (in their data) was similar for both China-competing and non-
competing sectors. We find that BDvR’s results are an artifact of their “patents plus
one” normalization, the relatively low level of patents in China-competing sectors, and
the tapering of the patent data. We conclude that the oft-cited finding that Chinese
competition increased innovation in Europe is not robust. More research focused on
making methodological improvements and extending the patent data series would be
helpful.
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